It's Too Soon To Put U.s. Troops Under Foreign U.n. Commanders The United Nations Is Far From Ready To Run A Global Police Force. Witness What Has Happened In Bosnia And Somalia.
President Clinton is reportedly on the verge of signing a directive to permit U.S. troops to serve under foreign commanders in U.N. peace-keeping operations.
It's easy to understand why the idea appeals. If it were possible to shift the burden of policing an increasingly messy world, America wouldn't have to play globocop and U.S. officials could focus on problems at home.
But Clinton should think again, and not just because many members of Congress are furious that he made this decision without much consultation. The questionable U.N. performances in Somalia and Bosnia have shown that the organization is many years away from being ready to play world policeman. There are serious questions about whether the United Nations can ever field an effective fighting force at all.
The United Nations has never played the role of international peace enforcer the way its founders anticipated. When the body was founded, provision was made for member states to make armed forces available on a permanent basis. The Cold War got in the way, and these provisions never came into force.
The U.N. operation in Korea only got started because the Soviet Union boycotted a crucial Security Council meeting (China wasn't yet a U.N. member). U.S. forces in Korea, though part of a U.N. mission, fought under American command.
After the Cold War ended, many observers thought the United Nations would finally come into its own.
The number of global U.N. peacekeeping operations mounted. The Gulf War seemed to set a precedent for Security Council cooperation. Member nations, were eager to dump messy ethnic and civil wars into the U.N.'s arms.
They were much too hasty.
For one thing, the Gulf War wasn't much of a precedent. It was mainly a U.S. show under a U.N. umbrella, with American troops under U.S command.
For another, as the United Nations started to experiment with peace enforcement (as opposed to peacekeeping where all sides to a conflict have agreed to stop fighting), the fallacies in the concept of a global supercop became apparent.
The first big problem was logistics. The United Nations isn't set up to run fighting operations. It's tall glass building on the East River is full of well-paid bureaucrats but has practically no military advisers, no war room, no intelligence or communications centers, and no financial resources.
The world body is now trying to set up a command center. But it will depend heavily on intelligence from member nations, notably Washington. And it is doubtful whether such a center will be sufficient for serious military operations.
That doesn't even address problems of how to raise and train troops from nations with totally different skill levels, weaponry and language. Or how to pay for them. Or decide where they should fight.
Which leads to the second and more serious problem: the relations between guns and politics.
U.N. involvement in fighting demands political decisions about where and how force should be used. Those decisions have to be made by the Security Council, and the U.N. Secretary General and accepted by nations who dispatch peace-enforcement troops. Political disagreements on whether or how to fight
put U.N. troops in risky positions.
The consequences of such squabbles have been on full display in Mogadishu and in Sarajevo.
In Somalia, the United Nations took over the operation from the United States in May. U.S. troops - only logistical units - were put directly under U.N. command for the first time, with one minor exception. But the 1,300 U.S. combat troops left in Mogadishu still serve under American officers.
But in Somalia, top U.N. officials and nations serving in the U.N. operation have been unable to agree on their mission.
The U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali wants to reestablish stability and rebuild the structure of the nation. That means Somali warlords must be disarmed.
The Italian contingent, however, opposed U.N. efforts to disarm and punish warlord Mohammed Aideed after he shot up Pakistani peacekeepers. The Italian commander insisted on taking orders from Rome, not the Turkish U.N. commander. When he was reprimanded, the Italian government decided to pull its troops out of Madadishu.
Down that path lies chaos. But one can envision any number of situations where historic frictions, or disdain or distrust would make it dicey for troops of one country to serve under a U.N. commander from another. That's why the Clinton proposal to let U.S. troops serve under U.N. commanders apparently contains provisions that would allow U.S. military officers to disregard orders they consider to be illegal or militarily questionable. But this makes a mockery of a unified military command.
In Bosnia, political disagreement between U.N. members has undercut the entire mission. U.N. peace-keeping forces were supposely dispatched to deliver humanitarian supplies to besieged civilians. They were given the mandate to use force if they were blocked.
But when Serb militias blocked aid and besieged Sarajevo, political disagreements among the members prevented the United Nations from acting. The French and British opposed U.S. proposals to threaten air strikes against the Serbs because they feared retaliation against their peacekeepers on the ground.
Political squabbles over potential U.N. missions are likely to multiply, especially if the Security Council expands to include Germany, Japan, India or Brazil. The end of the Cold War doesn't ensure Security Council agreement on what causes are worth fighting for. More likely the opposite.
And without such agreement, hopes for a U.N. globocop are vastly overrated.
http://articles.philly.com/1993-08-20/news/25969025_1_foreign-commanders-command-center-american-command
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